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Escaping the RICO Dragnet in Civil Litigation:




The spectre of being sued under the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organization Act (hereinafter "RICO") and of being la-
beled a "racketeer" strikes fear in the hearts of individuals and
firms.' Congress enacted RICO primarily as a blitzkrieg on organ-
ized crime, but it now encompasses pedestrian fraud claims and is
ubiquitous in civil litigation.s The reasons are threefold: (1) the
statute itself is hopelessly confusing and thus susceptible of mani-
fold interpretations;4 (2) the Supreme Court has accepted Con-
* Partner, Alston & Bird, Atlanta, Georgia.
1. 18 USC §§ 1961 et seq. The Supreme Court has cavalierly dismissed the notion
that the "racketeer" label is of special significance. See Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co., 473
US 479, 492 (1985) ("As for stigma, a civil RICO proceeding leaves no greater stain than do
a number of other civil proceedings").
2. The Senate Report accompanying the bill that eventually became RICO suc-
cinctly stated the purpose of the statute as "the elimination of the infiltration of organized
crime and racketeering into legitimate organizations operated in interstate commerce." Sen-
ate Comm. on the Judiciary, Report on Organized Crime Control Act of 1969, S Rep No 617,
91st Cong, 1st Sess 76 (1969). See generally, Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a
Criminal, Parts I and II, 87 Colum L Rev 661, 676-78 (1987). See also United States v
Turkette, 452 US 576, 591 (1981) ("[T]he major purpose of [RICO] is to address the infil-
tration of legitimate business by organized crime").
3. Based on an empirical review of civil RICO cases, Professors Blakey and Cessar
concluded that in 1986, 54.9% of all civil RICO cases involved common law fraud. G. Robert
Blakey & Scott D. Cessar, Equitable Relief under Civil RICO: Reflections on Religious
Technology Center v Wollersheim: Will Civil RICO Be Effective Only against White-Collar
Crime?, 62 Notre Dame L Rev 526, 619-22 (1987). See also Chief Justice William H. Rehn-
quist, Reforming Diversity Jurisdiction and Civil RICO, 21 St Mary's L J 5, 9 (1989) ("Vir-
tually everyone who has addressed the question agrees that civil RICO is now being used in
ways that Congress never intended when it enacted the statute in 1970. Most of the civil
suits filed under the statute have nothing to do with organized crime. They are garden-
variety fraud cases of the type traditionally litigated in state courts").
4. Justice Scalia has criticized RICO's vagueness and has intimated that RICO
would be unable to withstand constitutional challenge. See H.J. Inc. v Northwestern Bell
Tel. Co., 492 US 229, 251-56 (1989) (Scalia concurring). Justice Scalia's opinion, which was
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy, has served as the
catalyst for such constitutional challenges. See notes 87-89 and accompanying text.
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gress' instruction that RICO is to be "read broadly";5 and (3) the
rewards for victorious plaintiffs are alluring-treble damages, liti-
gation costs, and reasonable attorney's fees.6
The recent explosion of civil RICO lawsuits, ironically, has been
an unintended consequence of an awkward statute designed to fer-
ret out the infiltration of legitimate businesses by organized crime.
7
Section 1964(c) of RICO, which creates a private right of action,
was an eleventh-hour addition that "was debated only briefly," and
was described by Senator McClellan, the bill's co-sponsor, as a
"minor change." 8 Based on RICO's legislative history, Congress in-
cluded the private cause of action merely as "an additional weapon
to use against the corrupt infiltration of legitimate commercial ac-
tivities by organized crime."9
The Supreme Court, however, has steadfastly refused to inter-
pret RICO as an "organized crime" statute.'0 In United States v
5. See, for example, Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 497 ("RICO is to be read
broadly").
6. See 18 USC § 1964(c) (1988) ("Any person injured in his business or property by
reason of a violation of section 1962 of this chapter may sue therefor in any appropriate
United States district court and shall recover threefold the damages he sustains and the cost
of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee"). The lower courts have also held that
there is no right of contribution under RICO. See, for example, Minpeco, S.A. v ContiCom-
modity Servs., Inc., 677 F Supp 151, 154-55 (S D NY 1988); Miller v Affiliated Financial
Corp., 624 F Supp 1003, 1004 (N D Ill 1985). Thus, RICO plaintiffs enjoy in terrorem tacti-
cal advantages in RICO cases. Compare Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 506 (Marshall dissent-
ing) ("Many a prudent defendant, facing ruinous exposure, will decide to settle even a case
with no merit. It is thus not surprising that civil RICO has been used for extortive purposes,
giving rise to the very evils it was designed to combat").
7. See notes 2-3. See also the "Statement of Findings and Purposes" of RICO, Pub
L No 91-452, 84 Stat 922, 923 (1970) (purpose of RICO is "to seek the eradication of organ-
ized crime in the United States by strengthening the legal tools in the evidence gathering
process, by establishing new penal prohibitions, and by providing enhanced sanctions and
new remedies to deal with the unlawful activities of those engaged in organized crime"). As
one commentator has noted, "Between 1970 and 1985, only 300 civil RICO cases were filed.
• . . there were 614 filings in 1986, 1095 cases in 1987, and 957 cases in 1988." William J.
Hughes, RICO Reform: How Much Is Needed?, 43 Vand L Rev 639, 644 (1990).
8. See Note, Clarifying a Pattern of Confusion: A Multi-Factor Approach to Civil
RICO's Pattern Requirement, 86 Mich L Rev 1745, 1767 (1988). See also Hughes, 43 Vand
L Rev at 677-78 (cited in note 7) ("Everyone who has examined the legislative history of
RICO, with the exception of Professor G. Robert Blakey, has pointed out that Congress
added the private civil treble damages remedy to RICO with virtually no consideration of its
purpose or consequences").
9. Note, 86 Mich L Rev at 1768 (cited in note 8). As the Second Circuit has noted,
"The most important and evident conclusion to be drawn from the legislative history is that
Congress was not aware of the possible implications of section 1964(c)." Sedima, S.P.R.L. v
Imrex Co., 741 F2d 482, 492 (2d Cir 1984), rev'd, 473 US 479 (1985).
10. The Supreme Court's refusal to interpret RICO as an organized crime statute is
curious considering that, as Justice Powell observed, the Court in "Turkette and Russello
258
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Turkette," the Court rejected the argument that RICO was in-
tended solely to protect legitimate business enterprises from infil-
tration by organized crime (i.e., "racketeers"), and held that RICO
applies both to "legitimate" and "illegitimate" enterprises. 2 In
Sedima, S.P.R.L. v Imrex Co.,"3 the Court held that a RICO plain-
tiff does not have to allege and prove that the defendant had previ-
ously been convicted of predicate acts of racketeering,' 4 nor does a
RICO plaintiff need to allege and prove that he suffered "racke-
teering injury.'"'5
The Sedima, S.P.R.L. Court acknowledged that "private civil ac-
tions under [RICO] are being brought almost solely against [re-
spectable businesses], rather than against the archetypal, intimi-
dating mobster."' 6 The Court also acknowledged, by way of
understatement, that "RICO is evolving into something quite dif-
ferent from the original conception of its enactors.' 7 Nonetheless,
the Court made it clear that RICO's "breadth" (the Court pre-
ferred "breadth" to "vagueness") provides no justification for a ju-
dicial rewriting of the statute.
Yet, this defect-if defect it is-is inherent in the statute as written, and its
correction must lie with Congress. It is not for the judiciary to eliminate the
private right of action in situations where Congress has provided it simply
because plaintiffs are now taking advantage of its more difficult
applications.18
Most recently, the Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. v Northwestern
Bell Tel. Co.' 9 held that RICO does not require, in order to estab-
lish a "pattern of racketeering activity," allegations and proof of
multiple schemes of racketeering activity. 20 The Court once again
read RICO "broadly," but failed to articulate a principied method
of determining when a pattern of racketeering has been estab-
lished, noting instead that the "development of [the "relationship"
* . .found that the 'declared purpose' of Congress in enacting the RICO statute was 'to seek
the eradication of organized crime in the United States.'" Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 524
(Powell dissenting) (citations omitted).
11. 452 US 576 (1981).
12. Turkette, 452 US at 582.
13. 473 US 479 (1985).
14. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 493.
15. Id at 495.
16. Id at 499.
17. Id at 500.
18. Id at 499-500.
19. 492 US 229 (1989).
20. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 235.
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and "continuity" concepts] must await future cases, absent a deci-
sion by Congress to revist RICO to provide clearer guidance as to
[RICO's] intended scope. ' '2' The Court, also following Sedima,
S.P.R.L., rejected a "pinched construction" of a statute that "may
be poorly drafted, '22 because "rewriting it is a job for Congress, if
it is so inclined, and not for this Court.
'23
Although the Supreme Court has consistently refused to limit
the RICO dragnet, numerous lower federal courts have pinched
and pruned the statute considerably. Paradoxically, many of the
restrictive interpretations are based on the language of Section
1964(c), which creates a private right of action. RICO provides for
a civil remedy to "any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of section 1962. "124 With increasing fre-
quency, courts have required RICO plaintiffs to prove more than
"but for" factual causation, and have required them to prove that
a defendant's violation of one or more of the substantive provisions
of RICO proximately caused injury to the plaintiff's business or
property.25 Quietly, but not so subtly, many lower federal courts
have ignored the Supreme Court's admonition to interpret RICO
broadly, and have placed numerous obstacles in the way of private
enforcement of the statute.2 s
In addition to the potent standing and proximate cause defenses
that are available in many jurisdictions, some courts require RICO
plaintiffs to plead schemes to defraud with particularity.27 Other
21. Id at 243.
22. Id at 249.
23. Id. The volume of recent congressional activity suggests, if nothing else, that
many in the country are dissatisfied with RICO. See, for example, S 438, 101st Cong, 1st
Sess (Oct 25, 1989); HR 1056, 101st Cong, 1st Sess (Feb 22, 1989) (bills pending in the 101st
Congress that would limit recovery of treble damages to government plaintiffs or private
plaintiffs where the defendant previously has been convicted of related conduct); S 1523,
100th Cong, 1st Sess (July 22, 1987); HR 4239, 100th Cong, 2d Sess (March 8, 1990) (bills in
the 100th Congress using the prior-conviction approach to limit recovery of treble damages).
See generally Hughes, 43 Vand L Rev 639 (cited in note 7).
24. 18 USC § 1964(c) (1988).
25. See, for example, Ouaknine v MacFarlane, 897 F2d 75, 82-83 (2d Cir 1990)
("under the plain terms of the statute, to state a civil claim under § 1964(c) for a violation
of 1962(a), a plaintiff must allege injury 'by reason of' defendants' investment of racketeer-
ing income in an enterprise"); Morast v Lance, 807 F2d 926, 933 (11th Cir 1987) (dismissing
RICO claim because the plaintiff's injury "did not flow directly from the predicate acts").
26. The Supreme Court in Tafflin v Levitt, 493 US 455 (1990), recently held that
state courts have jurisdiction over RICO claims. Thus, RICO practitioners can anticipate
even more doctrinal confusion in this area of the law.
27. See, for example, Moore v Kayport Package Express, 885 F2d 531, 541 (9th Cir
1989) (pleadings must state the "specific content of the false representations as well as the
identities of the parties to the misrepresentations"); Schnitzer v Oppenheimer & Co., 633 F
260 Vol. 30:257
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courts require plaintiffs, usually soon after complaints are filed, to
respond to so-called RICO Case Statements which require plain-
tiffs to allege in detail the factual bases of their RICO allegations.28
Another defense that prevents RICO plaintiffs from getting past
the pleadings is that the plaintiff failed t6 distinguish the so-called
"enterprise" from the alleged pattern of racketeering activity. 29
Courts have also dismissed cases where a plaintiff has named the
defendant as the enterprise on the grounds that a defendant can-
not associate with himself.30
This latter defense has been raised in cases brought under Sec-
tion 1962(c), which makes it unlawful for a "person" to conduct
the affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering
activity.3
A quiet revolution of sorts is underway over the proper interpre-
tation of Section 1962(a), with the Second, Third, and Tenth Cir-
cuits leading the charge. Each of these circuits has held that a
plaintiff has standing to raise a claim under Section 1962(a) only if
he can show that his alleged injury was proximately caused by the
defendant's investment or use of income in an enterprise, which
income was derived through a pattern of racketeering activity.
3 2
The Fourth Circuit, as the defender of the ancient regime, has cor-
rectly noted that if these holdings are followed, "corporate liability
under RICO will be eviscerated. ' '33 The Fourth Circuit has also
correctly noted that such an interpretation of Section 1962(a)
"conflicts with the explicit policy that RICO be liberally inter-
Supp 92, 97 (D Or 1985) ("RICO's in terrorem effect is potent, in that a RICO defendant
faces the unsavory label 'racketeer' as well as the risk of triple damages... a RICO plaintiff
should plead the facts constituting the predicate offenses with the particularity required by
Rule 9(b)"); Saine v A.I.A., Inc., 582 F Supp 1299, 1306 n 5 (D Colo 1984) ("a charge of
racketeering, with its implications of links to organized crime, should not be easier to make
than accusations of fraud. RICO should not be construed to give a pleader license to bully
and intimidate nor to fire salvos from a loose cannon").
28. See, for example, Marriott Bros. v Gage, 912 F2d 1105, 1107 (5th Cir 1990).
29. See, for example, United States v Bledsoe, 674 F2d 647, 664 (8th Cir 1982) (if the
"enterprise cannot simply be the undertaking of the acts of racketeering, neither can it be
the minimal association which surrounds these acts"); Landry v Air Line Pilots Ass'n Int'l
AFL-CIO, 901 F2d 404, 433 (5th Cir 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 244 (1990).
30. See note 109.
31. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
32. See, for example, Ouaknine, 897 F2d at 83; Rose v Bartle, 871 F2d 331, 356-57
(3d Cir 1989); Grider v Texas Oil & Gas, 868 F2d 1147, 1149 (10th Cir), cert denied, 110 S
Ct 76 (1989). See also Old Time Enterprises, Inc. v International Coffee Corp., 862 F2d
1213, 1219 (5th Cir 1989); Craighead v E.F. Hutton & Co., 899 F2d 485, 494 (6th Cir 1990).
33. Busby v Crown Supply, Inc., 896 F2d 833, 838-39 (4th Cir 1990).
1992
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preted.'34 The Fourth Circuit's solution, however, relies on a dubi-
ous reading of Section 1964(c), obliterates the distinction between
Section 1962(a) and Section 1962(c), and manufactures a federal
common law cause of action for mail fraud and wire fraud.
3 5
Dialectical tensions engendered by the specific provisions of
RICO have manifested themselves more generally in the form of
constitutional challenges. These challenges, spurred in large part
by Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in H.J. Inc.,"8 are based on
the argument that RICO is unconstitutionally vague. 7 As Judge
Mikva has accurately observed, "Since logic was not the coin of the
realm when Congress drafted and debated RICO,... logic has not
proven to be a very useful tool in interpreting the statute. ' 38 Jus-
tice Scalia put the matter even more succinctly: RICO's vagueness
is "intolerable."39
The late Professor Lon Fuller, who wrote eloquently about the
"immorality" of obscure and vague laws, could have been writing
about RICO. In his famous allegory from The Morality of Law,
Professor Fuller wrote about a monarch named Rex who took to
the throne.
Rex came to the throne filled with the zeal of a reformer. He considered the
greatest failure of his predecessors had been in the field of law. For genera-
tions the legal system had known nothing like a basic reform.. . . Rex now
realized that there was no escape from a published code declaring the rules
to be applied in future disputes. Continuing his lesson in generalization,
Rex worked diligently on a revised code, and finally announced that it
would shortly be published. This announcement was received with universal
gratification. The dismay of Rex's subjects was all the more intense, there-
fore, when his code became available and it was discovered that it was truly
a masterpiece of obscurity. Legal experts who studied it declared that there
was not a single sentence in it that could be understood either by an ordi-
nary citizen or by a trained lawyer. Indignation became general and soon a
picket appeared before the royal palace carrying a sign that read, "How can
anybody follow a rule that nobody can understand?'
0
34. Busby, 896 F2d at 838.
35. -See notes 135-46 and accompanying text.
36. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 251-56 (Scalia concurring).
37. See, for example, notes 87-99 and accompanying text.
38. Yellow Bus Lines Inc. v Local Union 639, 913 F2d 948, 957 (DC Cir 1990) (Mikva
concurring).
39. 492 US at 255.
40. Lon Fuller, The Morality of Law at 33, 35-36 (Yale Univ. Press, 1969). Echoing a
similar sentiment, Ortega y Gasset wrote, "Barbarism is the absence of standards to which




Rex wisely withdrew his code. Unfortunately, RICO, which is
just as obscure as Rex's code, is still with us. Congress' admonition
that RICO be liberally construed has been pickled in the preserv-
ing juices of Supreme Court precedent, but in many instances the
lower courts do not seem to take heed. As a result, while RICO is a
doctrinal muddle, its apparent breadth is matched only by the ef-
forts many lower courts have made to narrow the dragnet.
This article will proceed first by providing an overview of RICO,
and will then analyze the various defenses the lower courts have
made available to defendants to parry RICO assaults. The article
will also argue that many of these defenses, while a welcome relief
from the RICO onslaught, are inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's admonition that RICO be interpreted broadly, but that
such "RICO tinkering" is probably unavoidable in light of RICO's
obscurantism.
II. STATUTORY OVERVIEW
RICO provides for a civil remedy-treble damages, costs and at-
torney's fees-to "any person injured in his business or property
by reason of a violation of Section 1962." 4 To establish a claim for
damages under RICO, a private plaintiff must prove that the de-
fendant violated the substantive RICO statute, commonly known
as "criminal RICO."42 Criminal RICO proscribes four types of ac-
tivities. Section 1962(a) prohibits the use or investment of income
derived from a "pattern of racketeering activity" to acquire or op-
erate an interest in an "enterprise." '43 Section 1962(b) prohibits ac-
quiring or maintaining an interest in or control of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering activity." Section 1962(c) pro-
hibits conducting or participating in the affairs of an enterprise
through a pattern of racketeering.45 Finally, Section 1962(d) makes
it unlawful to conspire to violate any of the substantive provisions
of criminal RICO.
46
"Racketeering activity" refers to the commission of any of the
state and federal offenses enumerated in 18 USC § 1961(1).
4
7
These offenses, the so-called "predicate acts," enable private plain-
41. 18 USC § 1964(c) (1988).
42. Id.
43. 18 USC § 1962(a) (1988).
44. 18 USC § 1962(b).
45. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
46. 18 USC § 1962(d) (1988).
47. 18 USC § 1961(1) (1988).
1992
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tiffs to allege that almost any type of business fraud constitutes
racketeering activity within the meaning of RICO.48 The three
most commonly alleged predicate acts in RICO litigation are mail
fraud, wire fraud, and fraud in the sale of securities.49
Congress' definition of a "pattern of racketeering activity" under
RICO is minimalist indeed: a pattern of racketeering activity "re-
quires at least two acts of racketeering activity" which were com-
mitted within ten years of each other, and one of which occurred
since the enactment of the statute (i.e., 1970).5o Congress made vir-
tually no effort to define or state the meaning of this concept, but
instead merely provided the courts with the broadest contours with
which they could, presumably, develop some meaningful concept. 1
The lower courts have made valiant attempts to give meaning to
this so-called definition of "pattern of racketeering activity," but
the results have been unsuccessful, and plaintiffs in most jurisdic-
tions enjoy great latitude with this flexible requirement.2
III. ELEMENTS OF A PRIVATE CAUSE OF ACTION UNDER RICO
A plaintiff must prove the following elements to make out a
48. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 500 ("The 'extraordinary' uses to which civil RICO
has been put appear to be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses
* * ."). Id. In dissent, Justice Marshall complained that the "Court's interpretation of the
civil RICO statute quite simply revolutionizes private litigation; it validates the federaliza-
tion of broad areas of state common law of fraud, and it approves the displacement of well-
established federal remedial provisions." Id at 501 (Marshall dissenting).
49. Id, ("The single most significant reason for the expansive use of civil RICO has
been the presence in the statute, as predicate acts, of mail and wire fraud violations"). See
also note 3. In Securities Investor Protection Corp. v Vigman, 908 F2d 1461, 1466 (9th Cir
1990), cert granted, Holmes v Securities Investor Protection Corp., 111 S Ct 1618 (1991),
the Ninth Circuit reversed the dismissal of a RICO claim based on securities fraud where
the plaintiff was neither a purchaser nor seller of securities, holding that the RICO statute
has no purchase-seller standing requirement. But see International Data Bank, Ltd. v
Zepkin, 812 F2d 149 (4th Cir 1987) (corporation lacks standing to bring RICO claim based
on securities fraud in relation to prospectus because corporation neither purchased nor sold
securities).
50. 18 USC § 1961(5).
51. Compare Friedrich August von Hayek, The Road to Serfdom at 78 (U of Chi
Press 1944) ("One could write a history of the decline of the Rule of Law . . . in terms of
the progressive introduction of these vague formulas [i.e., "fair" and "reasonable"] into leg-
islation and jurisdiction, and of the increasing arbitrariness and uncertainty of, and the con-
sequent disrespect for, the law and the judicature").
52. See notes 55-67 and accompanying text. In Sedima, S.P.R.L., the Court held, on
the one hand, that RICO is to be read broadly and lamented, on the other hand, that civil
RICO has been put to "extraordinary" uses, in part because of Congress' failure "to develop
a meaningful concept of 'pattern.'" 473 US at 497, 500. One obvious response is: if that
which is to be interpreted is not understood, how can it be interpreted liberally, conserva-
tively, or any other way?
Escaping RICO Dragnet
prima facie case under RICO: (1) a pattern of racketeering activity
or the collection of an unlawful debt; (2) the existence of an "en-
terprise ' '53 engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce;
(3) a causal nexus between the pattern of racketeering activity and
the enterprise; and (4) an injury to his business or his property by
reason of the above.
54
A. Proving a Pattern of Racketeering Activity
1. Judicial Activity Prior to the Supreme Court's Opinion in
H.J. Inc.
Prior to the Supreme Court's opinion in Sedima, S.P.R.L., some
courts held or assumed that two acts of racketeering activity satis-
fied RICO's statutory definition of pattern of racketeering activity
as long as the acts were related. In Sedima, S.P.R.L., the Court in
dicta suggested that two acts of racketeering activity are not
enough to establish a pattern of racketeering activity.5 6 In footnote
fourteen, the Supreme Court observed:
As many commentators have pointed out, the definition of a "pattern of
racketeering activity" differs from the other provisions in Section 1961 in
that it states that a pattern "requires at least two acts of racketeering activ-
ity," § 1961(5) . . .not that it "means" two such acts. The implication is
that while two racketeering acts are necessary, they may not be sufficient.
Indeed, in common parlance, two of anything do not generally form a "pat-
tern." The legislative history supports the view that two isolated acts of
racketeering activity do not constitute a pattern. As the Senate Report ex-
plained: "The target of [RICO] is thus not sporadic activity. The infiltration
of legitimate business normally requires more than one 'racketeering activ-
ity' and the threat of continuing activity to be effective. It is this factor of
continuity plus relationship which combines to produce a pattern." Simi-
larly, the sponsor of the Senate Bill, after quoting this portion of the Re-
port, pointed out to his colleagues that '[t]he term 'pattern' itself requires a
showing of a relationship .... proof of two acts of racketeering activity,
without more, does not establish a pattern. . . ." Significantly, in defining
"pattern" in a later provision of the same bill, Congress was more enlighten-
ing: "Criminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that
have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods
of commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteris-
53. 18 USC § 1961(4) (1988).
54. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 496.
55. See, for example, R.A.G.S. Couture, Inc. v Hyatt, 774 F2d 1350, 1355 (5th Cir
1985). A Fifth Circuit panel in Montesano v Seafirst Commercial Corp., 818 F2d 423 (5th
Cir 1987), followed R.A.G.S. Courture, Inc., but requested an en banc review of R.A.G.S.
Couture, Inc.
56. 473 US at 496 n 14.
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tics and are not isolated events." This language may be useful in interpret-
ing other sections of the Act.
57
Later on in the opinion, the Supreme Court, again in dicta, stated:
We nonetheless recognize that, in its private civil version, RICO is evolving
into something quite different from the original conception of its enactors.
. . . The "extraordinary" uses to which civil RICO has been put appear to
be primarily the result of the breadth of the predicate offenses, in particular
the inclusion of wire, mail, and securities fraud, and the failure of Congress
and the courts to develop a meaningful concept of "pattern." 58
The court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. did not attempt to develop a
meaningful concept of pattern because the issue was not before
it. 9 The lower federal courts, left to their own devices, struggled to
give meaning to this confused jargon, but their efforts degenerated
into RICO babel. The Supreme Court's recent opinion in H.J. Inc.,
while ostensibly deciding the pattern issue, sheds little guidance on
the question: what conduct is necessary to satisfy RICO's pattern
requirement?
After Sedima, S.P.R.L., the federal courts divaricated in their
attempts to give meaning to RICO's "pattern" requirement. Some
courts held that where the predicate acts were all committed in
furtherance of a single scheme, there could be no continuity among
them and thus the pattern requirement was not satisfied.6 0 The
Supreme Court rejected this theory in H.J. Inc. 1 The distinct mi-
nority view looked to the number of predicate offenses to deter-
mine if a pattern of racketeering activity had been established, and
if two related acts pursuant to a single scheme had been commit-
ted, a pattern of racketeering activity had been established.2 Al-
though the H.J. Inc. Court rejected such a minimalist requirement,
it did not reject per se single schemes to defraud.'
57. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 496 n 14.
58. Id at 500.
59. Id.
60. See, for example, Superior Oil Co. v Fulmer, 785 F2d 252 (8th Cir 1986); Schrei-
ber Dist. Co. v Serv-Well Furniture Co., 806 F2d 1393, 1399 (9th Cir 1986). Compare the
United States Department of Justice's RICO Guidelines, United States Attorneys' Manual
§ 9-110.340 (1990) (prohibiting DOJ attorneys from basing Section 1962(c) RICO indict-
ments on a pattern of racketeering activity arising out of a "single criminal episode or
transaction").
61. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 236.
62. See, for example, Beauford v Helmsley, 865 F2d 1386 (2d Cir), cert denied, 110 S
Ct 539 (1989); Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n v Touche Ross & Co., 782 F2d 966,
971 (11th Cir 1986). This view is certainly the "broadest" interpretation of Section 1961(5),
and is, arguably, the most faithful to the text of that statutory provision.
63. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 236-39.
Vol. 30:257
Escaping RICO Dragnet
Most courts had rejected any bright line "pattern" test and had
opted instead to decide the issue on a case-by-case basis.6 4 In
Sedima, S.P.R.L., the Supreme Court emphasized that it is "con-
tinuity plus relationship which combine to produce a pattern.
'65
The Second and Eleventh Circuits, in effect, ignored the continuity
aspect of the pattern requirement and focused exclusively on the
relationship aspect of that requirement.6
The majority of the federal courts, however, required plaintiffs
to show both continuity and relationship among the predicate
acts. 7
2. The Supreme Court's H.J. Inc. Opinion
The Supreme Court in H.J. Inc. attempted to provide more
guidance to RICO's pattern requirement, but, as Justice Scalia's
concurring opinion satirically observed, the majority's "guidance"
seemed "about as helpful to the conduct of their affairs as 'life is a
fountain.' "68 In H.J. Inc., the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of a complaint for failure to state a cause of ac-
tion because the complaint had only alleged a single scheme to de-
fraud. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that RICO does not
require allegations and proof of multiple schemes.
69
The Supreme Court rejected such a restrictive construction of
RICO, and it also rejected the view that "a pattern is established
merely by proving two predicate acts. '7 0 Thus, although the Court
disposed of polar opposites, it failed to articulate a meaningful
standard for determining when a pattern of racketeering has been
established. Instead, the Court despaired that the development of
such a standard "cannot be fixed in advance with such clarity...
[and] must await future cases, absent a decision by Congress to
revisit RICO to provide clearer guidance as to the Act's intended
scope. 171
64. See, for example, International Data Bank, Ltd. v Zepkin, 812 F2d 149, 154 (4th
Cir 1987); Lipin Enterprises, Inc. v Lee, 803 F2d 322, 324 (7th Cir 1986); Barticheck v
Fidelity Union Bank/First Nat'l State, 832 F2d 36, 38-39 (3d Cir 1987).
65. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 496 n 14.
66. See note 62.
67. See note 64.
68. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 252 (Scalia concurring).
69. Id at 236.
70. Id.
71. Id at 243. Even though the Court recognized that "[w]e are called upon in this
civil case to consider what conduct meets RICO's pattern requirement," id at 232, the Court
could do no better than to throw up its hands and hope that tomorrow would be a clearer
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Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, acknowledged the
amorphousness of the statutory pattern concept by euphemisti-
cally noting that "Congress indeed had a fairly flexible concept of a
pattern in mind. '7 2 This flexibility supposedly is given shape by
the tension between the concepts of "relatedness" and "con-
tinuity," so that, "to prove a pattern of racketeering activity a
plaintiff or prosecutor must show that the racketeering predicate
acts are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of con-
tinued criminal activity. '7 3 Although this would-be talismanic
"standard" has a ring of firmness as it rolls off the tongue, its ex-
plication manifests an inherent formlessness.
The Court defined "relatedness" as:
[C]riminal conduct forms a pattern if it embraces criminal acts that have
the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of
commission, or otherwise are interrelated by distinguishing characteristics
and are not isolated events. 4
The H.J. Inc. Court did not even attempt to define "continuity,"
hoping instead to "delineate the requirement. '75 The Court wrote:
"Continuity" is both a closed- and open-ended concept, referring either to a
closed period of repeated conduct, or to past conduct that by its nature
projects into the future with a threat of repetition. . . . A party alleging a
RICO violation may demonstrate continuity over a closed period by proving
a series of related predicates extending over a substantial period of time.
Predicate acts extending over a few weeks or months and threatening no
future criminal conduct do not satisfy this requirement .... Often a RICO
action will be brought before continuity can be -established in this way. In
such cases, liability depends on whether the threat of continuity is
demonstrated.
76
The Court virtually acknowledged the futility of articulating a
principled standard: the "limits of the relationship and continuity
concepts that combine to define a RICO pattern . . . cannot be
day.
72. Id at 239. Compare Helvering v Hallock, 309 US 106, 121 (1940) (the Court
"walks on quicksand when [it tries] to find in the absence of corrective legislation a control-
ling legal principle").
73. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 239. Justice Scalia concurred in the judgment because, in his
opinion, "nothing in the statute supports the proposition that predicate acts constituting
part of a single scheme (or single episode) can never support a cause of action under RICO."
Id at 256. Notwithstanding, Justice Scalia opined that the majority's "continuity plus rela-
tionship" pattern standard "seems to me about as helpful to the conduct of their affairs as
'life is a fountain.'" Id at 252.
74. Id at 240.
75. Id at 241.
76. Id at 241-42.
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fixed in advance with such clarity that it will always be apparent
whether in a particular case a 'pattern of racketeering activity' ex-
ists."77 The Court's failure is reminiscent of Justice Stewart's fa-
mous concurrence in Jacobellis v Ohio:7s "I shall not today at-
tempt further to define the kinds of material I understand to be
embraced within that shorthand description [i.e., 'hard-core por-
nography']; and perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing
so. But I know it when I see it.. . ,,79 Based on the Court's failure
to define intelligibly a pattern of racketeering activity, the lower
courts have, predictably, developed conflicting interpretations of
the pattern standard. 0
3. Post-H.J. Inc. Pattern Decisions
For example, the Fourth Circuit in Menasco, Inc. v Wasser-
man8 affirmed a district court's dismissal of a RICO complaint on
the grounds that it failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity, even though the complaint alleged the occurrence of predicate
acts over a one-year period. The Third Circuit recently affirmed
the dismissal of a RICO suit that alleged a nineteen-month scheme
aimed at a single entity.8 2 By way of contrast, the District of Co-
lumbia Circuit in Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v Local Union 63983 held
that four acts of vandalism and intimidation during a strike for
union recognition "meets the statutory requirements for a 'pattern
of racketeering activity.' ",84 The Eleventh Circuit, in United
States v Hobson,5 reduced the H.J. Inc. test to absurdity when it
affirmed the RICO conviction of a defendant for possession of
drugs on two separate occasions which were obtained from the
same organization."
77. Id at 243.
78. 378 US 184 (1964).
79. Jacobellis, 378 US at 197. It seems to be more than ironic coincidence that RICO
and pornography suffer from the same sorts of definitional difficulties.
80. Justice Scalia castigated the majority's pattern standards by "doubt[ing] that the
lower courts will find the Court's instructions much more helpful than telling them to look
for a 'pattern'-which is what the statute already says." H.J. Inc., 492 US at 252.
81. 886 F2d 681 (4th Cir 1989).
82. Kehr Packages, Inc. v Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F2d 1406 (3d Cir 1991).
83. 883 F2d 132 (DC Cir 1989), aff'd en banc, 913 F2d 948 (DC Cir 1990).
84. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 883 F2d at 139.
85. 893 F2d 1267 (11th Cir 1990).
86. Compare Phelps v Wichita Eagle-Beacon, 886 F2d 1262, 1273 (10th Cir 1989)




B. Constitutional Challenges to RICO
Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in H.J. Inc., which was joined
by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy,
accurately predicted that the lower courts would find scant guid-
ance in the majority's opinion. 7 Intellectual honesty, however,
moved Justice Scalia to acknowledge that it would be "unfair to be
so critical of the Court's effort, because I would be unable to pro-
vide an interpretation of RICO that gives significantly more guid-
ance concerning its application."'8 The problem, Justice Scalia
opined, is RICO's very vagueness, which he and three other Jus-
tices believe "is intolerable."89 Because of RICO's vagueness, Jus-
tice Scalia hinted at the demise of RICO should it be challenged on
constitutional grounds: "That the highest Court in the land has
been unable to derive from this statute anything more than today's
meager guidance bodes ill for the day when that challenge is
presented." 0
Since the Supreme Court's H.J. Inc. opinion, numerous RICO
defendants have asserted constitutional challenges to RICO. 9' In
United States v Angiulo,92 the First Circuit rejected a constitu-
tional challenge to RICO, holding that the case involved illegal ac-
tivities of an organized crime family, which Congress clearly in-
tended to include within the meaning of "pattern of racketeering
activity." 93
The First Circuit's reasoning and analytical process in Angiulo
should encourage constitutional challenges to RICO, but only to its
application in particular cases and not to the statute generally. For
instance, the Angiulo court noted that the applicable standard for
assessing whether a statute is void for vagueness is whether it
"fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice that his
contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute." 94 Moreover, "in
87. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 252 (Scalia concurring).
88. Id at 254-55.
89. Id at 255. See also Yellow Bus Lines v Local Union 639, 913 F2d 948, 957 (DC
Cir 1990) (Mikva concurring) ("Since logic was not the coin of the realm when Congress
drafted and debated RICO, .. logic has not proven to be a very useful tool in interpreting
the statute").
90. H.J. Inc., 492 US at 256.
91. See, for example, United States v Angiulo, 897 F2d 1169 (1st Cir 1990), cert de-
nied, 111 S Ct 130 (1991); Firestone v Galbreath, 747 F Supp 1556 (S D Ohio 1990); United
States v Andrews, 749 F Supp 1520 (N D Ill 1990).
92. 897 F2d 1169 (st Cir 1990), cert denied, 111 S Ct 130 (1991).
93. Anguilo, 897 F2d at 1179-80.
94. Id at 1178, quoting United States v Harriss, 347 US 612, 617 (1954).
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the absence of first amendment considerations, vagueness chal-
lenges must be examined in light of a case's particular facts." 95 Be-
cause the defendants in Angiulo had engaged in gambling, loan-
sharking, and conspiracy offenses, the First Circuit held that RICO
provided them with adequate notice that their offenses constituted
a pattern of racketeering activity.96
The District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, in Fire-
stone v Galbreath,97 relied on the reasoning in Angiulo to hold
that RICO was unconstitutionally vague as applied in that partic-
ular case.98 Firestone concerned a dispute between family mem-
bers concerning whether property should have remained in a rela-
tive's estate. Under those factual circumstances, the district court
held that the alleged activities of the family members "are in all
likelihood far removed from the typical situations which Congress
envisioned as being within RICO's scope of coverage."99
The courts' reasoning in Angiulo and Firestone do not augur
well for defendants who seek to challenge RICO generally on con-
stitutional grounds, as suggested by Justice Scalia. Those decisions
would support particular challenges by defendants who are unlike
"typical racketeers"-contrary to the Supreme Court's holding in
Turkette that RICO applies to "legitimate businesses" and its
holding in Sedima, S.P.R.L. that RICO is to be interpreted
broadly. This constitutional issue is just one of the many dialecti-
cal tensions between the Supreme Court and the lower courts over
the proper interpretation and application of an inscrutable statute.
C. Proving the Existence of an Enterprise
All of the prohibited acts under 18 USC § 1962 involve either
investing in,100 acquiring or maintaining an interest in,101 or con-
ducting or participating in the affairs'012 of an "enterprise." Under
95. Anguilo, 897 F2d at 1179.
96. See also United States v Pungitore, 910 F2d 1084, 1104 (3d Cir 1990) ("however
vague the statute may be as applied to legitimate businesses, its application to the criminal
activity of organized crime families is so clear as to be beyond peradventure"); United
States v Andrews, 749 F Supp 1520, 1523-24 (N D Ill 1990) (rejecting constitutional chal-
lenge to RICO's "pattern of racketeering" requirement where defendants allegedly were
members of a street gang trafficking in narcotics).
97. 747 F Supp 1556 (S D Ohio 1990).
98. Firestone, 747 F Supp at 1579-81.
99. Id at 1581.
100. 18 USC § 1962(a) (1988).
101. 18 USC § 1962(b) (1988).
102. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
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RICO, an enterprise "includes any individual, partnership, corpo-
ration, association or other legal entity and any union or group of
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity."103 This
statutory definition, like most of RICO's other provisions, is con-
fusing and has produced contrary decisions concerning the proper
interpretation of the term.
1. Legitimate Enterprises Are within RICO's Reach
In United States v Turkette, °4 the Supreme Court held that the
term "enterprise" encompasses both legitimate and illegitimate en-
terprises. The Court rejected the contrary view, which had been
adopted by the First Circuit. The First Circuit had reasoned that
to hold otherwise would be to hold that a "pattern of racketeering
activity" would be construed to mean the same thing as "enter-
prise."'1 5 The Supreme Court responded to that argument:
This conclusion is based on a faulty premise. That a wholly criminal enter-
prise comes within the ambit of the statute does not mean that a "pattern
of racketeering activity" is an "enterprise." In order to secure a conviction
under RICO, the Government must prove both the existence of an "enter-
prise" and the connected "pattern of racketeering activity." The enterprise
is an entity, for present purposes a group of persons associated together for
a common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct. The pattern of racke-
teering activity is, on the other hand, a series of criminal acts as defined by
the statute. 18 USC § 1961. The former is proved by evidence of an ongoing
organization, formal or informal, and by evidence that the various associates
function as a continuing unit. The latter is proved by evidence of the requi-
site number of acts of racketeering committed by the participants in the
enterprise. While the proof used to establish these separate elements in par-
ticular cases coalesce, proof of one does not necessarily establish the other.
The "enterprise" is not the "pattern of racketeering activity; it is an entity
separate and apart from the patterned activity in which it engages. The ex-
istence of an enterprise at all times remains a separate element which must
be proved by the Government.10 6
Thus, even though the Turkette Court held that there is no
sharp distinction between a "pattern of racketeering activity" and
an "enterprise," defendants have nonetheless successfully defeated
RICO actions by arguing that plaintiffs have failed to distinguish
sufficiently between an enterprise and the pattern of racketeering
103. 18 USC §1961(4) (1988).
104. 452 US 576 (1981).
105. Turkette, 452 US at 582.




2. The Enterprise Requirement and Section 1962(c) Liability
Under Section 1962(c), it is unlawful for a person employed by
or associated with an enterprise to conduct or participate in the
affairs of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activ-
ity." 8 Section 1962(c) is both the most complicated and most com-
monly used RICO sword in the arsenal. After Turkette, courts
have almost unanimously held that the "person" (i.e., defendant)
and the "enterprise" must be distinct entities under Section
1962(c), reasoning that a person cannot associate with himself. 0 9
Only the Eleventh Circuit has held that the person and the enter-
prise can be the same for purposes of Section 1962(c) liability." 0
RICO defendants have escaped Section 1962(c) liability in other
ways, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's instruction in Sedima,
S.P.R.L. to interpret RICO broadly. Courts have parsed Section
1962(c)'s language and have focused on the phrase "to conduct or
participate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of [the] enter-
prise's affairs.""' With regard to the proper interpretation of that
seemingly simple phrase, the courts have been "all over the lot.""' 2
The Second Circuit in United States v Scotto"1 has interpreted
that phrase broadly:
One conducts the activities of an enterprise through a pattern of racketeer-
ing when (1) one is enabled to commit the predicate offenses solely by vir-
tue of [one's] position in the enterprise or involvement in or control over
the affairs of the enterprise, or (2) the predicate offenses are related to the
activities of that enterprise.11
The Fifth Circuit has adopted a modified version of Scotto by con-
joining Scotto's two-part disjunctive test."5
107. See note 29.
108. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
109. See, for example, Schofield v First Commodity Corp., 793 F2d 28, 30-31 (1st Cir
1986); Bennett v United States Trust Co., 770 F2d 308, 315 (2d Cir 1985); Haroco, Inc. v
American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 747 F2d 384, 399-402 (7th Cir 1984), aff'd on other
grounds, 473 US 606 (1985).
110. United States v Hartley, 678 F2d 961, 989-90 (11th Cir 1982).
111. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
112. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v Local Union 639, 913 F2d 948, 957 (DC Cir 1990)
(Mikva concurring).
113. 641 F2d 47 (2d Cir 1980).
114. Scotto, 641 F2d at 54. See also United States v Yarbrough, 852 F2d 1522, 1544
(9th Cir), cert denied, 488 US 866 (1988) (adopting Scotto test).
115. United States v Cauble, 706 F2d 1322, 1333 (5th Cir 1983).
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The Eighth Circuit in Bennett v Berg'16 has adopted the most
restrictive test:
Mere participation in the predicate offenses listed in RICO, even in con-
junction with a RICO enterprise, may be insufficient to support a RICO
cause of action. A defendant's participation must be in the conduct of the
affairs of a RICO enterprise, which ordinarily will require some participa-
tion in the operation or management of the enterprise itself.
117
Not surprisingly, another Circuit Court of Appeals has reached the
opposite conclusion.""
Recently, the District of Columbia Circuit, en banc, adopted the
Bennett test and candidly acknowledged that it was construing
RICO narrowly." 9 In Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., the court noted that,
"[a]lthough arguably a broad reading of Section 1962(c) would be
consistent with Congress's express intention that RICO be liberally
construed in order to effectuate its remedial purposes . . . viola-
tions of Section 1962(c) can lead to criminal as well as civil penal-
ties.' 120 The Court of Appeals therefore refused to endorse a
"broad and boundless reading of Section 1962(c).''
3. The Enterprise Requirement and Liability under Sections
1962(a) and 1962(b)
Under Section 1962(a), which proscribes the receipt and subse-
quent investment of racketeering proceeds in an enterprise, most
courts have rejected a requirement that the "person" and "enter-
prise" be distinct.'2 2 Because Section 1962(a) does not contain the
same limiting language (i.e., "associating") as Section 1962(c),
courts have held that the "person" and the "enterprise" can be the
same entity.
116. 710 F2d 1361 (8th Cir 1983).
117. Bennett, 710 F2d at 1364.
118. Bank of Am. v Touche Ross & Co., 782 F2d 966, 970 (11th Cir 1986) ("It is not
necessary that a RICO defendant participate in the management or operation of the
enterprise").
119. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc. v Local Union 639, 913 F2d 948 (DC Cir 1990) (en banc).
120. Yellow Bus Lines, Inc., 913 F2d at 955.
121. Id at 956. Judge Mikva concurred in the judgment, but expressed some "misgiv-
ings" about the majority's narrow interpretation of RICO when the "Supreme Court has
previously cautioned us against restrictive interpretations of the statute that might frustrate
Congress' remedial purposes." Id at 957. Judge Mikva also expressed the hope that Congress
would finally "apply logic and order to the statute called RICO." Id at 958.
122. See, for example, Official Publications, Inc. v Kable News Co., 884 F2d 664 (2d
Cir 1989); Masi v Ford City Bank & Trust Co., 779 F2d 397 (7th Cir 1985). But see Wilcox
Dev. v First Interstate Bank, 590 F Supp 445 (D Or 1984), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 815
F2d 522 (9th Cir 1987) (requiring separation).
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Under Section 1962(b), which prohibits the acquisition or main-
tenance of an interest in an enterprise through a pattern of racke-
teering activity, the Ninth Circuit has held that the person and the
enterprise need not be distinct.123 The more persuasive view, how-
ever, is the position articulated by the court in Bruss Co. v Allnet
Comms. Servs., Inc."4 In Bruss Co., the district court compared
the language in Section 1962(c) to the language in Section 1962(b)
and held:
Although this provision does not contain the language in subsection (c) re-
quiring that the person be employed by or associated with the enterprise, it
does require that the person "acquire or maintain" an "interest in or control
of' any enterprise. Like the language in subsection (c), this language implies
that the person acquiring an interest in or control of the enterprise must be
separate from the enterprise itself. As with subsection (c), the language con-
templates that the enterprise is the victim, not the perpetrator, of the
crime. Separate entities must therefore fill the roles of the "person" and the
"enterprise." . . . The court therefore concludes that, for a cause of action
under § 1962(b), the person liable and the enterprise must be two distinct
entities.
1 25
IV. STANDING AND PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENTS
Many RICO defendants attack plaintiffs' claims on the grounds
that the alleged RICO offenses were not pleaded with particular-
ity. '2 In addition, courts are with increasing frequency favorably
receiving defenses asserting lack of standing and failure to prove
that alleged injuries were proximately caused by the substantive
violation. 127 For example, some courts have noted that, "[a]s a gen-
eral rule, RICO plaintiffs are entitled only to damages to business
or property proximately caused by the predicate acts."' 2 s
The decisions that require plaintiffs to show that their injuries
were proximately caused by a violation of Section 1962 appear to
be at odds with the Supreme Court's Sedima, S.P.R.L. opinion,
123. See, for example, Medallion TV Enters., Inc. v SelecTV of Cal., Inc., 627 F Supp
1290 (C D Cal 1986), aff'd, 833 F2d 1360 (9th Cir 1987), cert denied, 109 S Ct 3241 (1989).
124. 606 F Supp 401 (N D Ill 1985).
125. Bruss Co., 606 F Supp at 407. Accord Kredietbank N. v Joyce Morris, Inc., 3
RICO L Rep 264 (D NJ 1985), aff'd, 808 F2d 1516 (3d Cir 1986).
126. See text at note 27.
127. See, for example, Sperber v Boesky, 849 F2d 60 (2d Cir 1988); National Enter-
prises v Mellon, 847 F2d 251 (5th Cir 1988); Sears v Likens, 912 Fd 889 (7th Cir 1990). In
Sedima, S.P.R.L., the Supreme Court rejected the argument that a private plaintiff under
Section 1964(c) must prove a "racketeering injury." 473 US at 495.
128. Fleischauer v Feltner, 879 F2d 1290, 1300 (6th Cir 1989). See, for example,
Morast v Lance, 807 F2d 926, 933 (11th Cir 1987).
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which is confusing on this point. At one point in the Sedima,
S.P.R.L. opinion, and in specific reference to Section 1962(c), the
Court wrote that "the plaintiff only has standing if, and can only
recover to the extent that, he has been injured in his business or
property by the conduct constituting the violation."'12 9 Earlier in
its Sedima, S.P.R.L. opinion, however, and in reference to Section
1962(c) generally, the Court held that "[i]f the defendant engages
in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner forbidden by
these provisions, and the racketeering activities injure the plaintiff
in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under §
1964(c)."' 1 0
Which direction lower courts follow is significant. Under the for-
mer direction, a plaintiff must show that his injury was proxi-
mately caused by the substantive RICO violation. Under the latter
direction, a plaintiff need only trace his injuries to the alleged
racketeering activities. Justice Marshall, in his Sedima, S.P.R.L.
dissent, apparently believed that the majority intended to expound
the latter direction: "Under the Court's opinion today, two fraudu-
lent mailings or use of the wires occurring within 10 years of each
other might constitute a 'pattern of racketeering activity,'
leading to civil RICO liability.''
1
13
A. Interpreting Section 1962(a) Out of Existence
The standing and proximate cause requirements for Section
1962(a) claims are foreclosing recovery for many plaintiffs who can
show injury, show that the defendants engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity, and show that the defendants received in-
come therefrom. Section 1962(a) provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any person who has received any income derived,
directly or indirectly, from a pattern of racketeering activity ... to use or
invest, directly or indirectly, any part of such income, or the proceeds of
such income, in the acquisition of any interest in, or the establishment or
operation of, any enterprise which is engaged in, or the activities of which
affect, interstate or foreign commerce.
1 3 2
Thus, Section 1962(a) requires that a "person" (1) receive income
from a pattern of racketeering activity and (2) then use or invest
129. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 496.
130. Id at 495.
131. Id at 502 (Marshall dissenting).
132. 18 USC § 1962(a) (1988).
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that income in an "enterprise. '133 Moreover, pursuant to Section
1964(c), a private RICO plaintiff must show that he was injured in
his business or property by reason of the defendant's violation of
Section 1962(a). 34
As is true with virtually every other aspect of RICO, contrary
views exist with respect to the causation requirement of Section
1962(a). The narrower, better reasoned, and generally more ac-
cepted view requires that a plaintiff show that his injury was proxi-
mately caused by the use or investment of income that was derived
from a pattern of racketeering activity.13 In Grider v Texas Oil &
Gas Co., the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
a Section 1962(a) claim, holding that the "clear language" of Sec-
tion 1964(c) requires that a plaintiff allege injury by reason of a
violation of Section 1962(a), and not just injury from the racke-
teering activities. 136
In so holding, the Tenth Circuit declined to follow those district
courts that had held that, based on Sedima, S.P.R.L., plaintiffs
need only show injury from the racketeering acts.137 The Grider
court noted that Sedima, S.P.R.L. addressed the injury issue in the
limited context of Section 1962(c), which "specifically prohibits the
conduct of an 'enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity . . ."138
The Grider court also rejected the policy argument that, because
RICO is to be interpreted broadly, plaintiffs need only show injury
from the alleged racketeering activities.3 9 As the court of appeals
succinctly put it, "The general principle that RICO is to be ac-
corded a liberal interpretation cannot justify expanding Section
1962(a) beyond the limits of that subsection's own language.'
140
133. See Grider v Texas Oil & Gas Corp., 868 F2d 1147 (10th Cir), cert denied, 110 S
Ct 76 (1989) ("Significantly [§ 1962(a)] does not state that it is unlawful to receive racke-
teering income... "). Grider, 868 F2d at 1149 (emphasis in original).
134. 18 USC § 1964(c) (1988).
135. See, for example, Grider, 868 F2d at 1149; Ouaknine v MacFarlane, 897 F2d 75,
82-83 (2d Cir 1990) ("under the plain terms of the statute, to state a civil claim under §
1964(c) for a violation of § 1962(a), a plaintiff must allege injury 'by reason of' defendants'
investment of racketeering income in an enterprise"); Rose v Bartle, 871 F2d 331, 357-58
(3d Cir 1989).
136. 868 F2d at 1150-51.
137. See, for example, In re Nat'l Mtg. Equity Corp. Mtg. Pool Certif. Sec. Litig., 682
F Supp 1073, 1081-82 (C D Cal 1987); Smith v MCI Telecommunications Corp., 678 F Supp
823, 828-29 (D Kan 1987).





The Fourth Circuit, in Busby v Crown Supply, Inc.,4 1 rejected
the Grider "investment use" rule and held that allegations of in-
jury caused by the predicate acts of racketeering activity satisfy
Section 1964(c). 42 The Busby court opined that nothing in the lan-
guage of either Section 1962(a) or of Section 1964(c) "limits the
compensable racketeering injuries to those sustained by the . . .
investment and/or use of the [racketeering] income. "143
The Busby court also rejected the "investment use" rule on the
grounds "that it conflicts with the explicit policy that RICO be lib-
erally interpreted.' 44  As the Fourth Circuit perceptively
recognized:
If the [investment use] rule advocated by defendant is followed, however,
corporate liability under RICO will be eviscerated. Given that the named
"person" and the named "enterprise" must be separate for § 1962(c) pur-
poses, . . . plaintiffs injured by corporate racketeers have only § 1962(a) to
turn to for relief. . . . Invoking the "investment use" rule would close this
avenue off, as it is virtually impossible to prove that the invested income
caused the alleged injury.
14
1
The Fourth Circuit is correct: the investment use rule does cut
off potential avenues to treble damages. The Fourth Circuit's legis-
lative prestidigitation, however, is even worse, because it effectively
creates a federal common law private right of action for mail fraud
and wire fraud.146 Based on Busby, a plaintiff who can show only
that an agent of a corporate defendant caused him injury by the
fraudulent use of the mails and wires could sue the corporation
under Section 1962(a). Thus, the Busby holding not only eviscer-
ates Section 1964(c) and creates a federal cause of action in an area
where Congress chose not to provide such a cause of action, it also
141. 896 F2d 833 (4th Cir 1990).
142. Busby, 896 F2d at 837. See also Avirgan v Hull, 691 F Supp 1357, 1362 (S D Fla
1988); Mid-State Fertilizer Co. v Exchange Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 693 F Supp 666, 671 (N
D Ill 1988), aff'd on other grounds, 877 F2d 1333 (7th Cir 1989); Louisiana Power & Line
Co., 642 F Supp 781, 805 (E D La 1986).
143. Busby, 896 F2d at 837. The Second Circuit's reading of RICO is just the opposite.
See Ouaknine, 897 F2d at 82-83 ("under the plain terms of the statute. . . a plaintiff must
allege injury 'by reason of' defendants' investment of racketeering income in an enterprise").
Moreover, the Fourth Circuit begged the question when it referred to the "compensable
racketeering injuries." The very issue to be decided was what injuries are compensable, and
Section 1964(c) does not mention "compensable racketeering injuries." Section 1964(c) re-
fers only to injuries to "business or property by reason of a violation of section 1962."
144. Busby, 896 F2d at 838.
145. Id at 838-39.
146. 18 USC §§ 1341, 1343 (1988). Significantly, Congress has not created a private
right of action for either mail fraud or wire fraud.
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obliterates the clear distinction between Section 1962(a) and Sec-
tion 1962(c).
The Fourth Circuit's Busby opinion, however, is not unreasona-
ble in light of Sedima, S.P.R.L.'s mixed signals.14 7 The .Busby court
relied on the language in Sedima, S.P.R.L. that rejected the Sec-
ond Circuit's "racketeering injury" requirement and held:
If the defendant engages in a pattern of racketeering activity in a manner
forbidden by [§ 1962(a)-(c)], and the racketeering activities injure the
plaintiff in his business or property, the plaintiff has a claim under §
1964(c).'4 8
The Busby court also relied on a companion case to Sedima,
S.P.R.L., American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v Haroco, Inc.,1 49 in
which the Court stated:
[t]he submission that the injury must flow not from the predicate acts
themselves but from the fact that they were performed as part of the con-
duct of an enterprise suffers from the same defects as the amorphous and
unfounded restrictions on the RICO private action we rejected in
[Sedima].'50
Although the Fourth Circuit recognized that both Sedima,
S.P.R.L. and American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. involved claims
under Section 1962(c), it dismissed that fact by opining that "it is
clear that the Supreme Court was referring to § 1962 as a
whole .. ."'5 The Busby court's efforts to be faithful to the Su-
preme Court's exhortations of liberal statutory construction come,
as noted above, at too high a price.
B. The Standing Requirement of Section 1962(c)
Section 1962(c) makes it unlawful for "any person employed by
or associated with any enterprise engaged in, or the activities of
which affect, interstate or foreign commerce, to conduct or partici-
pate, directly or indirectly, in the conduct of such enterprise's af-
fairs through a pattern of racketeering activity .... ,,151 In Sedima,
S.P.R.L., the plaintiffs had brought an action under Section
1962(c), and while the issue, was not before the Supreme Court, the
147. See notes 129-31 and accompanying text.
148. Busby, 896 F2d at 839, quoting Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 495 (emphasis in
original).
149. 473 US 606 (1985).
150. Busby, 896 F2d at 839, quoting Haroco, 473 US at 609.
151. Busby, 896 F2d at 839.
152. 18 USC § 1962(c) (1988).
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Court nonetheless made it clear that "the plaintiff only has stand-
ing if, and can only recover to the extent that, he has been injured
in his business or property by the conduct constituting the viola-
tion.' 1 53 The conduct constituting the violation under Section
1962(c) is the actual conducting or participating in the affairs of an
enterprise through a pattern of racketeering activity. Thus, the
Court in Sedima, S.P.R.L. held:
Where the plaintiff alleges each element of the violation, the compensable
injury necessarily is the harm caused by predicate acts sufficiently related to
constitute a pattern, for the essence of the violation [i.e., § 1962(c)] is the
commission of those acts in connection with the conduct of an enterprise
. . . Any recoverable damages occurring by reason of a violation . . . will
flow from the commission of the predicate acts.'5'
Based on this language, some courts have required plaintiffs to
show that their injuries were directly and proximately caused by
defendants' racketeering activities. 5 5 Absent such a showing,
plaintiffs are not entitled to recover damages, even if they can
show a RICO violation and injury to their business or property.
C. Recovery under RICO's Conspiracy Provision
Section 1962(d) provides that "[i]t shall be unlawful for any per-
son to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsections (a),
(b), or (c) of this section.' 56 The prerequisite to liability under
Section 1962(d) involves an agreement to commit one of the activi-
ties prohibited under any of the subsections of 1962.111 If a plain-
tiff fails to prove an injury from the substantive violation, he will
be unable to prove how an alleged conspiracy to commit the viola-
tion caused him injury. 8
There is, predictably, a split of authority on the question of
whether the defendant must personally agree to commit the predi-
cate acts. 59 In the Second Circuit, a required element of a RICO
153. Sedima, S.P.R.L., 473 US at 496.
154. Id at 497.
155. See, for example, Morast v Lance, 807 F2d 926, 933 (11th Cir 1987) (dismissing
RICO claim because the plaintiff's injury "did not flow directly from the predicate acts").
156. 18 USC § 1962(d) (1988).
157. See, for example, United States v Elliott, 571 F2d 880 (5th Cir 1978) (must have
an agreement to commit a violation of § 1962; an agreement to commit predicate acts is not
enough).
158. See Grider, 868 F2d at 1151 (granting motion to dismiss § 1962(d) claim because
plaintiffs failed to allege that § 1962(a) violation caused injury).
159. Compare United States v Kragness, 830 F2d 842 (8th Cir 1987) (defendant need
not personally commit the predicate acts as long as he agrees to their commission by an-
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conspiracy is that the defendant himself [had] agreed to commit
two or more predicate acts. 60 The Eleventh Circuit, however, has
held that when "a defendant agreed to participate in the conduct
of an enterprise's affairs with the objective of violating a substan-
tive RICO provision, it is not necessary that the defendant agreed




RICO is a study in legal obscurantism. Just like King Rex's code
in Professor Fuller's allegory, RICO contains nary a sentence that
is within the grasp of reasonable comprehension and understand-
ing. Whereas Rex withdrew his code and started over, Congress has
left it to the courts to divine meaning from an inscrutable statute,
a task more appropriately befitting the disciplines of hermeneutics
and semeiotics rather than jurisprudence.
In response, the Supreme Court has attempted to ossify Con-
gress' admonition to interpret RICO broadly, but has failed to con-
vert RICO's vague formulas into meaningful standards of behavior.
The lower courts, nonplussed by the hopelessness of the situation,
have rendered contrary decisions on virtually every aspect of
RICO, and in many instances, have simply ignored the Supreme
Court's exhortations of liberal statutory construction.
RICO jurisprudence has thereby been converted into gamesman-
ship with a concomitant decline in the respect for the rule of law.
Civil RICO is characterized by pleadings games and rank forum
shopping,162 where plaintiffs search for those jurisdictions that ex-
pand the RICO accordion and defendants cite cases that contract
the accordion. All the while, the emanating sounds are RICO
cacophony.
Civil RICO is incoherent, and the fault is to be found within the
statutory framework. Federal judges have struggled mightily to im-
pose order on this chaos, but have realized that the task is a will-
o'-the-wisp. Unless Congress repeals or modifies RICO, or unless
other party); Casperone v Landmark Oil & Gas Corp., 819 F2d 112 (5th Cir 1987) (same),
with United States v Teitler, 802 F2d 606 (2d Cir 1986) (defendant must agree to commit
two predicate acts); United States v Winter, 663 F2d 1120 (1st Cir 1981).
160. United States v Benevento, 836 F2d 60, 73 (2d Cir 1987), cert denied, 486 US
1043 (1988).
161. United States v Carter, 721 F2d 1514, 1531 (11th Cir 1984) (emphasis added).
162. RICO's nationwide service of process and venue provisions facilitate this un-
seemly behavior. See 18 USC § 1965.
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one more Justice becomes convinced that RICO is "intolerable,"
Rex's citizens will continue to ask: how can anybody follow a rule
that nobody can understand?
